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The Effects of Food Stamps on Exiting Welfare and Becoming Employed for 
Welfare Recipients 
 
Abstract 
Welfare reform’s success encouraging employment may be affected by the federal 
Food Stamp program because many households receive welfare and Food Stamps.   Food 
Stamp benefits could discourage employment because benefits are reduced proportionally 
with income; alternatively, it could encourage employment by increasing stability and 
allowing more resources to be allocated toward employment-related expenses.  I examine 
the effects of Food Stamps on exiting welfare and becoming employed for welfare 
recipients.  Results suggest, if anything, that Food Stamps discourage employment, and 
such benefits may discourage transitions off welfare, too.  If so, then it may be necessary 
to study the determinants of welfare participation (welfare reform and economic growth) 
in conjunction with other government-assistance programs. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 One of the largest government assistance programs in the United States has 
traditionally been cash welfare (formerly, Aid to Families with Dependent Children [AFDC]; 
currently, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families [TANF]), with annual federal, state, and 
local government expenditures (benefits and administrative costs) reaching a maximum of 
roughly 26 billion in 1994 (National Poverty Center, 2008).  However, during the 1990s, the 
welfare caseload decreased by roughly 50 %, from a high in 1994 of 5.03 million families to 
2.55 million families by 1999 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2008).  
Concurrently, the number of individuals served by the welfare program decreased during this 
time, from a high of 14.20 million individuals (in 1993) to 6.82 million individuals.  Since 
the 1990s, the numbers of welfare caseloads and individuals served have fallen more 
modestly, with 1.77 million families and 4.15 individuals on welfare in 2006. (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2008).    
 The decline in welfare receipt is typically attributed to welfare reform and a robust 
economy during the 1990s (CEA, 1997, 1999; Wallace and Blank, 1999; and Ziliak et al., 
2000).  Examining each in turn, the 1996 Welfare Reform Act (formally, The Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act – PRWORA) specifically sought to 
encourage employment.  It did so by placing five-year lifetime receipt limits and work 
requirements on welfare benefits for most recipients, although most states had received 
waivers to make similar changes as many as four years prior to welfare reform.   In addition, 
the business cycle may have played a role decreasing welfare participation.  In particular, 
economic growth during the 1990s with a relatively low unemployment may have facilitated 
transitions off welfare to employment. 
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 Other government assistance programs could also affect transitions off welfare and 
employment.  Certainly many recipients are eligible for and receive benefits from multiple 
programs.  For example, Food Stamps, which is now the largest government assistance 
program for those with low incomes, could affect welfare transitions and employment by 
changing economic incentives.  Food Stamp benefits could discourage transitions off welfare 
to employment by serving as an implicit income tax: earnings generated by employment 
decrease Food Stamp benefits.  To the extent that employment increases disposable income, 
the value of Food Stamp benefits proportionally decreases or could be terminated altogether.  
Food Stamp benefits could also decrease the marginal value of earnings from employment. 
 Furthermore, transaction costs and stigma may not increase proportionately with 
participation in additional assistance programs (Keane and Moffitt, 1998).  That is, additional 
transaction costs and stigma associated with welfare for those with Food Stamp benefits may 
be less than for those without Food Stamps.  If so, then Food Stamp receipt could discourage 
transitions off welfare to employment by decreasing transaction costs and stigma associated 
with participation in welfare. 
 However, Food Stamps could encourage transitions off welfare and employment by 
increasing economic opportunities.  Food Stamp benefits potentially increase economic 
opportunities by allowing a larger portion of disposable income to be allocated toward 
employment-related expenses such as transportation and childcare costs.  Much the same, 
Food Stamps could promote transitions off welfare to employment by increasing stability. 
Alternatively, any relationship between Food Stamps and welfare transitions and 
employment could be due to correlation with other factors.  First, welfare recipients with 
Food Stamps may be more likely to have characteristics typically associated with 
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economic disadvantage relative to welfare recipients without Food Stamp benefits.  
Certainly Food Stamps are targeted for households with low income.  Much the same, 
those with Food Stamps may comprise a disproportionately large share of long-term 
welfare recipients.  If either are true, then welfare recipients with Food Stamps would be 
more likely to remain on welfare and less likely to become employed regardless of the 
Food Stamp benefits. 
I examine the effects of Food Stamps on exiting welfare and employment for a 
sample of welfare recipients using National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) data.  
Specifically, I first select spells of welfare receipt for NLSY79 respondents who are either 
simultaneously not employed and employed.  Then, I track the non-employed welfare 
recipients and the employed welfare recipients until they either exit welfare or change their 
employment status.  I then examine the effects of Food Stamps on leaving welfare and 
employment.  In addition, a portion of the analysis explores whether the effects of Food 
Stamps on welfare and employment are different before and after welfare reform.   
Throughout, I attempt to control for potential unobserved heterogeneity bias by jointly 
estimating the various welfare-employment transition probabilities with Food Stamp receipt 
using a discrete factor random effects model in a maximum likelihood framework. 
Results consistently suggest that Food Stamps significantly increase the probability 
that employed welfare recipients remain on welfare but cease to be employed.  There is also 
some evidence that Food Stamps decrease the probability that welfare recipients who are not 
employed move off welfare and become employed and that Food Stamps decrease the 
probability that employed welfare recipients leave welfare while remaining employed, 
although these results are not statistically significant in some of the model specifications.  In 
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sum, the results suggest, if anything, that Food Stamps discourage employment, and such 
benefits may discourage transitions off welfare, too.  If so, then it may be necessary to study 
the determinants of welfare participation (welfare reform and economic growth) in 
conjunction with other government-assistance programs. 
II. Background 
 
The Food Stamp program was officially established by the 1964 Food Stamp Act.  Its 
primary goal is to provide adequate nutrition to low-income households -- those living in 
poverty.  The program does this by providing participants coupons (or electric benefits 
transferred directly to a retailer) redeemable for food at approved grocery stores (USDA, 
2003).  In 2003, the FSP served an estimated 21.3 million participants (USDA, 2004), and 
program participants averaged $83.92 in monthly benefits at a cost (which includes 
administrative costs) of $23.8 billion to the government (USDA, 2004).  To be eligible for 
FSBs, a household must: 
• Have gross monthly income less than a household size-specific amount, though the 
gross income test is disregarded if the household contains an elderly (aged 60 and 
over) or disabled member. 
• Have net monthly income (gross income minus 20 percent of earned monthly income, 
a standard deduction, child support payments, a dependent care deduction, an excess 
shelter cost deduction, and medical expenses for elderly and disabled household 
members) less than a household size-specific amount. 
• Have assets whose value is less than a specified amount.  This amount is not specific 
to household size, but the amount is higher if the household contains an elderly or a 
disabled member.  Further, the full value of the family’s vehicles is not counted – 
instead, only each vehicle’s value above a year-specific threshold amount is counted 
as an asset. 
Households that receive AFDC/TANF or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) are 
automatically eligible for benefits.  However, if such households have sufficient income, then 
their Food Stamp allotment may be zero.   
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III. Literature Review 
 Many studies have examined factors that influence welfare receipt, including 
those factors that may have decreased welfare participation after welfare reform during 
the 1990s (Blank, 2002, and Moffit, 2002, provide reviews of this literature).  For 
example, the CEA (1997, 1999), Wallace and Blank (1999), and Ziliak et al. (2000) 
attribute between 6 and about 33 % of the decline in welfare participation in the 1990s to 
welfare reform and up to 78 % of the decline to the business cycle (and a low 
unemployment rate).  Much the same, Hoynes (2000) finds that local labor market 
conditions significantly affect one-year welfare exit and re-entry rates.  In studies 
specifically examining time limits, Grogger (2003), Grogger and Michalopoulos (2003), 
and Grogger (2004) find evidence that this particular welfare reform decreased welfare 
receipt between 13 and 19 % (and increased employment).  
 In a related section of the literature, many studies have examined the effects of 
welfare on labor supply.  Many (but not all) of these studies find that welfare generates 
work disincentives (Levy, 1979; Moffitt, 1986).  For example, Blau and Robins (1986) 
find that welfare significantly decreases transitions to employment, and Hoynes (1996) 
finds that AFDC benefits through the Unemployed Parent (AFDC-UP) program 
significantly decrease labor supply.  Conversely, Moffitt and Rangarajan (1986) conclude 
that changes in the AFDC tax rate will have little effect on labor supply among female 
household heads.  Relatedly, surprisingly few researchers have examined the effects of 
Food Stamps on labor supply.  Those who do (Fraker and Moffitt, 1988, examine single 
parents and Hagstrom, 1996, examines married couples) find either negative effects that 
are small or no effects at all.  The studies in this literature are often static, examining 
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labor supply at one particular time, they often use pre-welfare reform data, and, as 
suggested, they typically examine one particular government transfer programs in 
isolation.   
 Both the literature examining the determinants of welfare and the literature 
examining the effects of welfare receipt (and the effects of Food Stamps) on labor supply 
have been extended by studies that simultaneously account for participation in multiple 
transfer programs.  For example, Grogger (2003) examines the effects of the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC) on welfare use, and Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) 
simultaneously examine the effects of welfare, the EITC, and Medicaid on the labor 
supply of single mothers.  A couple of these studies simultaneously examine welfare and 
Food Stamp program participation.  For example, Huffman and Jensen (2005) estimate 
models for labor force participation, welfare participation, and Food Stamp program 
participation using 1998 Survey of Programme Dynamics data.  They find that welfare 
receipt increases participation in the Food Stamp program and decreases participation in 
the labor force and that labor force participation decreases participation in the Food 
Stamp program.  In another example, Fraker and Moffitt (1988), using pre-reform data 
from 1980, jointly examine the effects of the Food Stamp program and AFDC on labor 
supply.  Accounting for various sources of non-linearity in the budget constraint, they 
find modest negative effects of both government assistance programs on hours of work, 
and that increasing welfare and Food Stamp benefits increases participation in the other 
program.  Similarly, Keane and Moffitt (1998) estimate a structural labor supply model 
with participation in multiple transfer programs (welfare, Food Stamps, and public 
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housing) using 1984 Survey of Income and Program Participation data.  They find that 
transfer program marginal tax rates have small effects on labor supply. 
 I seek to build on this literature by examining the effects Food Stamp benefits on 
quarterly transitions off welfare and employment.  This extends the literature, first, 
because few studies have specifically examined the effects of Food Stamps on welfare 
recipients moving off welfare.  Second, none of the studies cited above examine patterns 
of welfare receipt, employment, or Food Stamp program participation in a dynamic 
context.1  I examine the quarterly probability moving off welfare and changing 
employment status, following each welfare spell for up to four years.  I also extend the 
literature by examining these effects including post-welfare reform data, when 
corresponding time limits and work requirements were in force. 
IV. Data 
 
I use data from the 1979-cohort National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) to 
estimate the effects of Food Stamps on transitions off welfare and employment.  The 
NLSY79 began annually collecting information on the labor market and welfare experiences 
and background characteristics of youths who were between the ages of 14 and 21 in 1979.  
After 1994, the survey began surveying biennially, and the survey continues on this basis.  
The original NLSY79 sample contained 6,283 women and an oversample of blacks, 
                                                 
1 Blank and Ruggles (1996) examine spells of AFDC and Food Stamp Program eligibility 
and participation, but they do not examine the effects of participating in one program on the 
other.  Much the same, Ribar, Edelhoch, and Liu (2008) examine spells of welfare and Food 
Stamp program participation in South Carolina, but they do not examine the effects of the 
programs on each other. 
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Hispanics, low-income whites, and military personnel.  The military sample was dropped in 
1984 and the low-income white sample was dropped in 1990, and I do not consider 
respondents from either sample in my analysis.  
The NLSY79 identifies each respondent’s employment status and the number of 
hours of work in every week covered by the survey (1979 through the most recently-released 
survey, which is currently 2004).  Therefore, I am able to construct a work history for each 
respondent that identifies whether she is employed in each quarter during the survey.   Much 
the same, the NLSY79 collects monthly information about each respondent’s participation in 
government assistance programs.  This includes information about AFDC/TANF receipt as 
well as the receipt of Food Stamps.  In particular, the NLSY79 separately identifies whether 
each respondent receives AFDC/TANF and Food Stamp benefits in each month covered by 
the survey as well as the amount of each type of benefit received in each month.  However, 
information on welfare program participation is not collected for NLSY79 respondents under 
the age of 18 who are not married, not in college, and without children.  Ultimately, I only 
include in the analysis observations from the 1988 and successive NLSY79 surveys (when 
respondents are at least 23 years of age).  As a result, in my final sample, welfare usage does 
not increase simply because youths cross the 18-year threshold.     
I first disaggregate each respondent’s welfare-employment status in each quarter of 
the survey into the following mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories: on welfare and 
not employed, on welfare and employed, not on welfare and employed, and not on welfare 
and not employed.  I consider respondents to be employed in a quarter if they work an 
average of at least 10 hours a week in that quarter.  I then identify each spell of welfare 
receipt for each respondent, each of which potentially constitutes an individual observation.  
 8
From this group, I include in the analysis welfare spells of respondents who are mothers with 
children under the age of 18.  Few of these welfare observations are for respondents who are 
male or without children under the age of 18.  I exclude observations that do not provide the 
requisite information to be used in the estimation.   
It is not necessarily clear which years of data should be included in the analysis.  
After the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act until welfare waivers were first 
introduced in the early 1990s, state welfare program characteristics were largely similar.  
Welfare eligibility criteria began changing in the early 1990s during the pre-welfare reform 
waiver period, and changes continued with the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which, along with placing five-year lifetime 
receipt limits and work requirements on welfare recipients, formally gave states the latitude 
to determine their welfare program’s asset limit.   Using pre-welfare reform data (from the 
1980s, for example) would have the advantage of including more of the business cycle (or 
multiple business cycles) and more person-year observations.  However, the determinants of 
welfare transitions and employment for those moving off welfare before and after welfare 
reform may be different, suggesting using only post-welfare reform data.  Further, some have 
argued that it is useful to include pre-welfare reform waiver-era data from the early 1990s 
because welfare changes occurring during this time were limited and are easy to quantify; 
conversely, it may be difficult to control completely for the myriad of changes states initiated 
after PRWORA.   
Ultimately, I estimate the models essentially using data from the pre-reform waiver 
and welfare reform eras.  That is, I only include welfare spells that begin after 1988 or prior 
to 2004.  This results in 945 welfare spells (producing 5,152 welfare-quarter observations) 
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where the mother is initially on welfare and not employed full-time and 645 welfare spells 
(1,638 welfare-quarter observations) where the mother is initially on welfare and employed. 
I explore the implications of including the supplemental black and Hispanic 
oversamples by estimating unweighted models with the supplemental samples, weighted 
models with the supplemental samples, and models with the supplemental samples 
excluded.2  When weighted, my sample will be a nationally representative sample of welfare 
spells beginning from 1988 to 2004 to mothers with children under the age of 18 who were 
between the ages of 23 and 30 in 1988.  However, results from this sample will not 
necessarily be representative of other cohorts or of welfare spells for this cohort that began 
prior to 1988 or after 2004.    
I follow each spell quarterly until the quarter in which the mother either exits welfare, 
changes her employment status, or both, up to a maximum of 16 quarters (four years).3  Once 
a mother’s welfare or employment status changes (that is, once she exits welfare or switches 
from employed to not employed or from not employed to employed), I am no longer 
interested in her behavior.  Therefore, I have censored each mother’s record once she leaves 
welfare or changes her employment status.  
Descriptive Statistics
                                                 
2 The results using these three approaches are comparable.  For brevity, sample weights are 
used throughout the analysis (for descriptive statistics and for the regression results). 
3 I also perform the analysis examining monthly rather than quarterly transitions.  The results 
are essentially the same.  For ease of interpretation, I present results from quarterly transition 
rates.  
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The key outcome variables are the quarterly probabilities that a mother on welfare 
and not employed will either (i) exit welfare and remain not employed, (ii) remain on welfare 
but become employed, or (iii) exit welfare and become employed as well as the quarterly 
probabilities that a mother on welfare and employed will either (i) exit welfare and remain 
employed, (ii) remain on welfare but become not employed, and (iii) exit welfare and 
become not employed.4  
Figure 1 shows the cumulative probabilities that a mother initially on welfare and not 
employed moves off welfare but remains not employed, remains on welfare but becomes 
employed, and moves off welfare and becomes employed, holding welfare-employment 
constant for the remainder of the 16 quarters once a transition has been made.  After four 
years, only slightly more than 10 % of the mothers remain on welfare and not employed.  
Almost half move off welfare without employment, although a sizable proportion (30 %) 
remain on welfare and become employed.  Figure 2 shows the cumulative probabilities that a 
                                                 
4  Initially, I attempted to estimate the effects of Food Stamps on the probability of remaining 
off welfare (conditional on exiting the program), on the probability of remaining employed 
(conditional on being employed when exiting welfare), and on the types of childcare 
arrangements and quality characteristics selected (conditional on children being present).  
However, the sample sizes for these models were too small to provide meaningful estimates.  
For example, only about 55 % (875) of the welfare spells ultimately exit welfare, and only 
about 40 % (365) of these were employed.  Similarly, of those leaving welfare with 
employment, less than 100 have children young enough for which to be asked the NLSY79 
childcare questions, which is necessary information for estimating the probability of selecting 
various types of child care arrangements (day care, center care, informal care, etc.).   
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mother initially on welfare and employed moves off welfare but remains employed, remains 
on welfare but becomes not employed, and moves off welfare and becomes not employed, 
again holding welfare and employment constant once a transition has been made for the 
remainder of the 4-year period.  Virtually no one remains on welfare and employed for four 
years.  Roughly 50 % remain on welfare but become not employed, with another 40 % 
moving off welfare and remaining employed.  Surprisingly, figures 1 and 2 suggest that few 
welfare recipients exit welfare and change their employment status in the same quarter 
(ultimately, about 15 % in figure 1 and less than 10 % in figure 2). 
Figure 3 plots the same probabilities for mothers on welfare but not employed 
without Food Stamps.  Figure 4 does the same for those with Food Stamps.  A comparison of 
these figures suggests that Food Stamps are associated with a lower probability of exiting 
welfare.  However, Food Stamps are associated with a higher probability of becoming 
employed while remaining on welfare but a lower probability of becoming employed while 
exiting welfare.  Overall, Food Stamps are correlated with a slightly higher probability of 
remaining on welfare and not employed. 
Much the same, figure 5 plots the probabilities of a spell ceasing for mothers on 
welfare and employed without Food Stamps, as does figure 6 for mothers with Food Stamps.  
Food Stamps are associated with a lower probability of moving off welfare and remaining 
employed.  Just the opposite, they are positively correlated with remaining on welfare and 
ceasing to be employed.  Food Stamps appear to have little association with simultaneously 
moving off welfare and ceasing to be employed in the same quarter. 
The descriptive statistics and correlations presented thus far do not necessarily 
represent the causal effects of Food Stamps on welfare receipt and employment.  To identify 
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causal effects, I use multivariate regression analysis to hold constant potentially confounding 
factors.  First, I control for demographic characteristics such as race/ethnicity, age, education, 
marital status, household composition (household size, the presence of a senior citizen, and 
the numbers of biological children in various age categories), urban residence, state of 
residence, and survey year of response.  Weighted descriptive statistics (with standard errors 
that have been adjusted for sample stratification and clustering) and definitions for these and 
other variables (descriptive statistics of state and year dummy variables are excluded from 
table 1) are presented in table 1.  For example, 37.3 % of my sample is African-American 
(referred to as black henceforth for brevity) and 9.9 % is Hispanic.   
I also control for local (county or SMSA) economic conditions because economic 
conditions may affect participation in public assistance programs.  To do this, I include 
variables identifying the local unemployment rate, potential earnings (proxied by local per 
capita income), the % of the local labor force that is female, the % of the local population 
with a high school education and a college education, the % of the local population 
employed, and the % of the local labor force in manufacturing and wholesale/retail trade.  I 
add controls for state political orientation because liberal states may have more generous 
Food Stamp Program eligibility criteria and may also be less likely to stigmatize those who 
receive welfare.  Specifically, I control for state political orientation with variables indicating 
how often members of the state’s congressional delegation (representatives and senators 
separately) cast liberal votes as measured by Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) as 
well as the political affiliation of the governor and state legislature (representatives and 
senators separately) (Americans for Democratic Action, 2005).   
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Lastly, I control for AFDC/TANF Program characteristics.  The 1996 welfare reform 
act began allowing states to develop their own TANF eligibility standards, benefits, and time 
limits.  Since that time, states have tailored unique TANF programs.  I include a TANF 
dummy variable equal to one if PRWORA welfare reform is in force and a pre-PRWORA 
welfare waiver dummy variable equal to one if a pre-welfare reform state waiver is in force 
either terminating or reducing benefits due to time limits, changing work exemption policies, 
changing sanctions for violations, increasing earned income disregards, changing family cap 
rules, or implementing work requirements (see Crouse, 1999).  In addition, I include controls 
for other state TANF program characteristics.  States differed in their monthly maximum 
benefit levels (for example, state-specific household size-specific maximum AFDC/TANF 
benefits for a family of four) prior to PRWORA; after PRWORA, states began differing in 
their time limits in which recipients may receive TANF benefits (months of allowable 
lifetime receipt), whether household benefits are capped for births occurring during 
participation spells (family caps), child age (in months) for which caregivers are exempt from 
work requirements, their most severe sanctions for program violations (whether the most 
severe sanction is full or permanent instead of partial and temporary), their income/asset 
limits, and their earned income disregards (flat dollar amounts and percentages of earnings 
disregarded from benefits calculation for the first month with earnings).  Information 
required to create these variables is obtained from a report on state AFDC/TANF policies by 
Crouse (1999) and from the Urban Institute’s online Welfare Rules Database (The Urban 
Institute, 2005). 
Table 2 separately presents selected descriptive statistics for demographic variables 
for welfare spells initially with and without Food Stamp benefits.  Those with Food Stamps 
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do not necessarily appear to be more economically disadvantaged.  For example, those with 
Food Stamps are less likely to be Hispanic, more likely to be married, have smaller family 
sizes, and are less likely to live in an urban area.  However, receiving Food Stamps is 
associated with being more likely to be black, being younger, having less education, and 
having more children aged 0 through 17.   
V. Empirical Specification 
 
I estimate the effects of Food Stamps on two conditional quarterly probabilities: that a 
mother on welfare and not employed either exits welfare and remains not employed, remains 
on welfare and becomes employed, or exits welfare and becomes employed, and that a 
mother on welfare and employed either exits welfare and remains employed, remains on 
welfare and ceases to be employed, or exits welfare and ceases to be employed (within 16 
quarters).  The only mothers who are “at risk” to exit welfare or change their employment 
status are those who are still on welfare with their initial employment status; once a mother 
either exits welfare or changes her employment status, the welfare spell-observation exits the 
sample.  Thus, in each quarter of each welfare spell, each mother must make a multinomial 
discrete-choice decision: whether to exit welfare and whether to switch from employed to not 
employed or from not employed to employed.   
For quarter t, let the expected present discounted value for mother i receiving welfare 
benefits without employment (WN) be VitWN, let the expected present discounted value for 
mother i receiving welfare while employed (WE) be VitWE, for mother i not receiving welfare 
without employment (NN) be VitNN, and not receiving welfare with employment (NE) be 
VitNE, where 
Vitj = Xitβj+εitj, 
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X is a vector of explanatory variables, β is a vector of coefficients, and ε is the disturbance 
for j = WN, WE, NN, and NE.  Mother i is assumed to choose activity j from the set of J to 
maximize utility such that Vitj > Vitj’ for all j ≠ j′.  That is, if mother i is initially on welfare 
and not employed (model k = 1), then she will select option j1 from set J1 = {NN, WE, NE} 
such that  for all j
′
> 11 jit
j
it VV 1 ≠ j1′, and if mother i is initially on welfare and employed 
(model k = 2), then she will select option j2 from set J2 = {NE, WN, NN} such that 
 for all j
′
> 22 jit
j
it VV 2 ≠ j2′.  For example, if mother i is on welfare and not employed in 
quarter t, then she will exit welfare and become employed in quarter t+1 if Vit+1NE > 
Max{Vit+1WN, Vit+1WE, Vit+1NN}.   
 I model the corresponding hazard rates (λ1itNN, λ1itWE, and λ1itNE and λ2itNE, λ2itWN, and 
λ2itNN) using the multinomial logit functional form.  To show the impact of spell duration on 
the hazard rates, I could assume a parametric functional form for the duration variables.  
However, Meyer (1990, 1995) shows that picking the wrong parametric specification for the 
duration variables will results in inconsistent estimates.  Instead, Meyer recommends a semi-
parametric approach where time is represented by a vector of time-varying dummy 
variables.5   
Mothers who receive Food Stamps may be systematically different than mothers who 
do not receive Food Stamp benefits in unobserved ways that are correlated with both welfare 
receipt, employment, and Food Stamp benefits.  Therefore, I estimate both discrete choice 
                                                 
5 In Meyer’s (1990) study of unemployment benefits, he uses duration dummy variables to 
allow the baseline hazard to spike upward in the interval corresponding to benefit exhaustion. 
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equations simultaneously with a quarterly equation for the amount of Food Stamp benefits 
received by mother i in quarter t,  
Yit = Zitα + ε3it, 
where Z is a vector of explanatory variables (X ≠ Z), α is a vector of coefficients, and ε3it 
is the Food Stamp equation disturbance, allowing cross-period correlation among the 
unobservables.  If the same unobserved factors determine whether mothers receive 
welfare and are employed as well as whether mothers receive Food Stamps, then failure 
to control for cross-equation correlation will result in biased estimates.  For example, 
suppose that mothers with high preferences for leisure are more likely to receive welfare 
without employment and to receive Food Stamp benefits.  If so, then Food Stamps would 
spuriously appear to decrease the probably of switching from receiving welfare without 
employment because Food Stamps would at least partially serve as a proxy for 
preferences for leisure.   
To model this cross-equation correlation, I assume that the error terms include an 
independently and identically distributed component (ν) and components representing the 
unobserved person-specific factors (μ1,…,μM): 
∑ ∑
=
−
=
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for k = 1 (with j1 = NN, WE, and NE) and k = 2 (with j2 = NE, WN, and NN), where the γs 
are factor loadings, is a set of dummy variables in which, for instance,  equals one 
if the welfare spell is of duration τ at time t (welfare spells are tracked for up to 16 quarters, 
∑
−
=
Γ
1
1
T
it
τ
τ τΓ
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so T-1 = 15), and M is the number of common factors.  This structure assumes that the 
idiosyncratic disturbances (the νs) are uncorrelated with the unobserved factors (the μs), but 
cross-equation correlation exists because the error structure contains the same unobserved 
variables (the μs).   Furthermore, interacting a vector of duration dummy variables (∑ ) 
with the mass points potentially controls for duration-specific unobserved sources of cross-
equation correlation.  This model’s complete conditional likelihood (LL) function 
contribution for mother i is  
−
=
Γ
1
1
T
it
τ
τ
LLi(μ1,...,μM) = {∏   ( = 1⏐μ
=
T
t 1
∑
=
3
1kj
itkjk
d kjkitλ itkjkd 1,...,μΜ) × Pr(Yit|μ1,...,μΜ)}  
for model k = 1, 2, where  is an indicator variable that equals one if mother i switches to 
welfare-employment state j
itkjk
d
k in quarter t, and T is the maximum number of quarters covered 
by the model (16 months).  
Failure to control for unobserved heterogeneity also potentially produces biased 
results due to dynamic self-selection.  In particular, dynamic self-selection bias results 
because successive quarterly probabilities are estimated from the sample of mothers who 
remain on welfare without employment (or who remain on welfare with employment).  Thus, 
subsequent time periods may contain a sample of mothers with heterogeneous characteristics.  
For example, again assume some mothers have high preferences for leisure that are 
unobserved and that are correlated with remaining on welfare without employment.  If so, 
then exiting welfare and/or becoming employed will be correlated with low preferences for 
leisure, and the “surviving” sample of mothers who remain on welfare without employment 
will tend to have high preferences for leisure.  Lancaster (1979, 1985) shows that when 
 18
dynamic self-selection is present, unobserved heterogeneity will bias the effect of any 
included regressor toward zero.   
To control for unobserved heterogeneity, I use a strategy similar to the one proposed 
by Heckman and Singer (1984) and used by many others (Gritz 1993; Ham and LaLonde 
1996; Blau and Hagy 1998; Hotz, Xu, Tienda, and Ahituv 1999; Mroz 1999) where a step 
function is used to approximate the distribution of the unobserved variables.  That is, I 
“integrate out” these factors by approximating the unobserved heterogeneity’s distribution 
with a step function of mass points and probability weights jointly with the other parameters.  
For example, the distribution of each unobserved factor μ is Pr(μ=μn) = θn, with n = 1,…,N 
and where N is the number of mass points in the distribution of μ, and θ is the 
probability that μ equals a particular point of support.  Identification is achieved by setting 
the first mass point equal to zero and the second mass point equal to one for each factor.  The 
additional mass points and the probability weights are restricted to lie between zero and one, 
but the factor loadings are allowed to take any value.  With M different factors of μ, the 
unconditional likelihood function is given by 
∑
=
=
N
n
n
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1θ
∑ ∑∑∏
= ===
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where N, μ, and θ are as defined above and Θ are the other parameters to be estimated.   
 This approach is adapted from the full information maximum likelihood framework, 
but instead of assuming that the unobservables between equations are jointly normally 
distributed, it allows the distribution of the error terms to take any form by estimating a 
flexible discrete factor step function to approximate the unobserved heterogeneity’s 
distribution.  Mroz (1996) and Mroz and Guilkey (1996) show that this estimator performs 
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well versus two-stage least squares and full information maximum likelihood estimation that 
assumes jointly normally distributed errors.  Specifically, it is more efficient than two-stage 
least squares, and it is consistent when the errors are not jointly normally distributed. 
Gritz (1987) and Heckman and Walker (1990) explain that there are no well-
established rules for determining the number of factors and mass points to use in these types 
of models.  Standard log-likelihood ratio tests are inappropriate in this instance since 
parameters that fall on the boundary space violate the chi-squared distribution conditions.  In 
later work, Gritz (1993), referring to Akaike’s Information Criterion (Akaike 1973), suggests 
adding factors and points of support as long as the value of the likelihood function improves 
by at least one point for each additional parameter.  Alternatively, Blau (1994) and Mroz 
(1999) continue adding factors and mass points to the model as long as they improve the 
value of the likelihood function.   In my analysis, I use one common factor with three points 
of support.  Specifications using additional factors or points of support did not improve the 
value of the likelihood function, with many of these specifications failing to converge.  Using 
Gritz’s (1993) criteria, I am unable to reject the joint null hypothesis that additional factors 
and mass points are not warranted because the value of the likelihood function did not 
significantly improve with any combination of additional factors and mass points.   As I 
added factors and mass points, I examined the change in the coefficients.  Continuing to add 
factors and mass points (in addition to one common factor with three points of support) left 
the estimates virtually unchanged. 
I achieve identification in two ways.  First, identification is secured by functional 
form.  Specifically, the index functions and discrete factors enter corresponding equations 
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non-linearly.  Second, I include instruments in the vehicle ownership model that are not 
included in the employment equation.   
As instruments, I use state variation in Food Stamp eligibility laws.  The NLSY79 
identifies each respondent’s state of residence, which enables me to link measures of state 
Food Stamp eligibility criteria with each respondent.  The state Food Stamp eligibility laws 
control for: whether states provide FSBs via coupons or the Electronic Benefit Transfer 
(EBT) program (starting in 1989, states began switching from the coupon system to the EBT 
program, and by 1999, 35 states were providing benefits electronically (Ziliak et al., 2003)); 
whether only parents or non-parental adults in the household can be considered caregivers of 
dependents if a child is present; whether the state uses simplified periodic reporting instead 
of incident reporting; whether residents are categorically eligible for FSBs if they qualify for 
other types of welfare; whether the state’s employment and training sanctions are severe; and 
whether the state has a FSP-approved outreach plan designed to increase program 
participation (Gabor and Botsko, 1998; Super and Dean, 2001; Knaus, 2003). 
These characteristics will serve as exogenous instruments identifying FSBs if (i) they 
significantly explain Food Stamp receipt and (ii) do not significantly affect pregnancy weight 
gain independently of FSBs.  These eligibility criteria are probably valid instruments on both 
counts.  Certainly state Food Stamp eligibility criteria should affect FSBs by determining 
who is eligible (for empirical evidence of this, see Kabbani and Wilde, 2003).  Further, it 
seems reasonable to assume that state Food Stamp eligibility criteria are unrelated to 
pregnancy weight gain when controlling for FSBs.  For example, state legislatures probably 
do not alter FSP eligibility criteria based on a state’s incidence of ideal pregnancy weight 
gain.  Ultimately, log-likelihood ratio tests indicate that these eligibility characteristics and 
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Food Stamp eligibility criteria are indeed valid instruments for FSBs.  That is, the value of 
the log-likelihood function significantly improves when these variables are added to the 
FSBs equation but not when they are added to the pregnancy weight gain equation.  
[Appendix table A presents a full set of results for the FSBs equation.]   
VI. Results 
 
 In separate models, I jointly estimate the amount of Food Stamp benefits received 
and the probabilities of switching from on welfare and not employed to off welfare and 
not employed, on welfare and employed, and off welfare and employed and the 
probabilities of switching from on welfare and employed to off welfare and employed, on 
welfare and no longer employed, and off welfare and no longer employed.  Food Stamp-
related results are presented in table 3, with a representative set of non-Food Stamp-
related results (with the full set of covariates included) presented in appendix table B.  I 
initially include only the individual-specific demographic covariates (model 1), and then I 
successively add state and year dummy variables (model 2), local economic covariates 
(model 3), state political variables (model 4), and state AFDC/TANF welfare program 
characteristics (model 5).   
 Results show that Food Stamp benefits significantly increase the probability that 
mothers on welfare and employed remain on welfare and cease to become employed at 
the 1 % level in all five model specifications.  That is, regardless of the combinations of 
covariates included, Food Stamps seem to discourage employment for welfare recipients.  
At the same time, Food Stamps decrease the probability that mothers on welfare and not 
employed exit welfare and become employed.  This result tends to be statistically 
significant at roughly the 10 % level across the five model specifications.  However, 
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Food Stamps do not significantly affect the other possible transitions.  For example, there 
is no significant evidence that Food Stamps prompt mothers on welfare and not employed 
either to move off welfare and remain not employed or to remain on welfare and become 
employed. 
 It is difficult to quantify the magnitudes of the effects discussed above because 
the multinomial logit model specification is non-linear.  Therefore, I next predict the 
survival rate for remaining on welfare without employment and the cumulative 
probabilities of moving off welfare without employment, remaining on welfare with 
employment, and moving off welfare without employment without Food Stamp benefits 
(figure 7) and with Food Stamp benefits of $200 per month (figure 8) as well as the 
survival rate for remaining on welfare with employment and the cumulative probabilities 
of moving off welfare with employment, remaining on welfare without employment, and 
moving off welfare without employment without Food Stamp benefits (figure 9) and with 
Food Stamp benefits of $200 in each month (figure 10).   
 Comparing figures 7 and 8, the probability of remaining on welfare without 
employment (the survival rate) by the end of the 16 quarters increases by about 2 
percentage points with Food Stamps, from roughly 10 to 12 %.  Simultaneously, Food 
Stamp benefits decrease the probability of ultimately moving off welfare with 
employment by about 5 percentage points, from about 22 to 17 %. 
 Comparing figures 9 and 10, virtually no one “survives” (remains on welfare with 
employment) for the entire 16 quarters.  Food Stamps increase the probability of 
switching from welfare with employment to welfare without employment by about 16 
percentage points, from roughly 42 to 58 %.  Although statistically insignificant, the 
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probability of moving off welfare while remaining employed is about 17 percentage 
points lower with Food Stamps. 
 The results do not seem to be sensitive to the combination of covariates included; 
however, they may be sensitive to how employment is defined or to sample selection 
criteria.  To explore the robustness of my results, I next re-estimate the models re-
defining employment to be any market-place work (rather than an average of at least 10 
hours per week during the quarter).  For this and successive robustness tests, I present 
results from preferred models that include the full set of covariates, equivalent to model 5 
in table 3.  Presented as model 1 in table 4, results suggest that Food Stamps continue to 
increase the probability that mothers on welfare with employment remain on welfare but 
cease to be employed at the 1 % level.  Furthermore, the magnitude of this effect remains 
largely unchanged.  In addition, Food Stamp benefits now also significantly decrease the 
probability that these mothers move off welfare while remaining employed at the 10 % 
level.  (Actually, this effect was almost statistically significant in table 3, with t-statistics 
often greater than 1.0).  In contrast to the results in table 3, Food Stamps do not 
significantly affect any of the transitions for mothers on welfare and not employed in 
model 1. 
 Much the same, when I again re-specify employment to be market-place work of 
at least 20 hours per week during the quarter (model 2 in table 4), Food Stamps continue 
to increase the probability of moving from on welfare and employed to on welfare and 
not employed.  There remain no statistically significant effects on the transitions for 
mothers on welfare without employment.  
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 Next, I re-estimate the models including only mothers of children under the age of 
14 (rather than mothers with children under the age of 18).  This is because mothers 
beginning spells of welfare with children above the age of 13 will not necessarily be 
constrained by the federal five-year lifetime receipt limit imposed by the 1996 Welfare 
Reform Act.  However, results from model 3 in table 4 are much the same as the original 
results in table 3: Food Stamps continue to reduce the probability of switching from 
welfare and employed to welfare and not employed at the 1 % level.  The magnitude of 
this effect remains largely unchanged, as well.  Food Stamps also decrease the probability 
that mothers on welfare without employment will move off welfare with employment, 
now at the 5 % confidence level.  
 In a last robustness check, I re-estimate the models including only single mothers 
rather than mothers regardless of marital status.  Results are presented in model 4 in table 
4.  This specification eliminates only a small portion of the observations, and conclusions 
remain virtually unchanged. 
 Welfare recipients after welfare reform may behave differently than those prior to 
program changes due to, for example, receipt time limits and work requirements.  If so, 
then the effects of Food Stamps after welfare reform may be different.  Therefore, I next 
re-estimate the models using the original sample and original definition of employment, 
interacting the Food Stamp covariate with a dummy variable indicating whether welfare 
reform is in force.   The results of key covariates are presented in table 5.  Starting with 
the sample of mothers on welfare and employed, the effects of Food Stamps are the same 
regardless of welfare reform: the Food Stamp-welfare reform interaction term has a 
statistically insignificant effect on each transition for these welfare recipients (results 
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presented in the bottom panel of table 5).  In addition, Food Stamps now decrease the 
probability of moving off welfare with employment at the 10 % confidence level, as was 
true for some of the alternative samples. 
 Next consider the effects of Food Stamp benefits before and after welfare reform 
for mothers on welfare and not employed (results presented in the top panel in table 5).  
Prior to welfare reform, results again show that Food Stamps significantly decrease the 
probability of moving off welfare with employment.  However, Food Stamps with 
welfare reform have the opposite effect, increasing this transition rate.  After welfare 
reform, Food Stamps also increase employment in other ways.  In particular, Food 
Stamps after welfare reform increase the probability that mothers on welfare and not 
employed will remain on welfare with employment.  This effect is statistically significant 
at the 1 % level. 
 I also separately estimate the models for welfare recipients in the south.  
Examining the effects of Food Stamps on welfare and employment transitions in the 
south is particularly important because, relative to the non-south, welfare caseloads have 
fallen much more dramatically since welfare reform, TANF rules are ranked as 
particularly stringent, and per-capita income and welfare benefits are lower (Henry and 
Lewis, 2001; Nord ,1998).   To do this, I interact the Food Stamps covariate with a 
dummy variable for residence in the south.  Results, displayed in table 6, suggest that the 
effects of Food Stamps do not vary between the south and non-south.  That is, the Food 
Stamps-south interaction term has statistically insignificant effects on each of the various 
transition rates.  The effects of Food Stamps otherwise remain essentially unchanged, 
where such benefits decrease the probability that mothers on welfare and employed move 
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off welfare and remain employed and increase the probability that such mothers remain 
on welfare and cease to be employed. 
 In addition, I examine the effects of other government assistance programs.  In 
most cases, the effects of other types of assistance are statistically insignificant.  For 
example, in table 7, I present the effects of Food Stamp benefits and the effects of public 
housing assistance.  As indicated, the effects of housing assistance are statistically 
insignificant in each instance, although the effects of Food Stamp benefits remain 
unchanged.  This could be because welfare recipients are less likely to receive assistance 
from other government programs relative to the Food Stamp program.  An alternative 
explanation is that these results are due to data limitations.  In particular, the NLSY79 
does not collect monthly information about receipt of public housing assistance, as it does 
for Food Stamp receipt.  Instead, information on government housing assistance only 
reflects receipt as of the survey date. 
VII. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 Results in this paper consistently show that Food Stamp benefits increase the 
probability that employed mothers on welfare remain on welfare but without 
employment.  Furthermore, at least some evidence indicates that Food Stamps decrease 
the probability that employed mothers on welfare leave welfare while remaining 
employed and that Food Stamps decrease the probability that mothers on welfare without 
employment leave welfare with employment.  These results are often robust to alternative 
definitions of employment and to sample selection criteria. 
 Perhaps Food Stamps discourage employment because such benefits are 
implicitly taxed as income from earnings increases.  Yet another explanation is that Food 
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Stamps decrease the marginal value of earnings from employment by increasing 
consumption.  Much the same, Food Stamps could discourage transitions off welfare by 
decreasing the marginal costs of applying for welfare, enrolling in the welfare program, 
and stigma.    
 These results are important because they suggest that when attempting to explain 
declining welfare rolls over the past 15 years, researchers should consider the effects of 
welfare reform, economic conditions, and another, third factor in their decompositions: 
other government-assistance programs.  These results are new in that others have not 
jointly examined the effects of other government-assistance programs on transitions off 
welfare and employment in a dynamic context with post-reform data.  This study 
attempts to address this by examining quarterly welfare and employment transition rates, 
simultaneously incorporating receipt from one of the largest government-assistance 
program for those in poverty – the Food Stamp program.  This study also is one of the 
few to incorporate post-welfare reform data.  This is important because corresponding 
results show that the effects of Food Stamps, particularly for mothers on welfare without 
employment, may be significantly different, where Food Stamps may encourage 
employment and transitions off welfare with employment.
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample 
Key Explanatory Variable Full Sample 
Food Stamp Benefits (in $100s) 2.036 (0.064) 
Demographic Characteristics   
Black (=1 if black) 0.373 (0.042) 
Hispanic (=1 if Hispanic) 0.099 (0.018) 
Age (in years) 31.484 (0.232) 
Education (in years) 11.846 (0.073) 
Marital Status (=1 if married) 0.241 (0.025) 
Family Size (number in household) 4.129 (0.104) 
Senior Citizen (=1 if a senior citizen is present) 0.068 (0.012) 
Children 0 – 2 (number of biological children aged 0 through 2) 0.301 (0.027) 
Children 3 – 5 (number of biological children aged 3 through 5) 0.432 (0.027) 
Children 6 – 10 (number of biological children aged 6 through 10) 0.858 (0.042) 
Children 11 – 13 (number of biological children aged 11 through 13) 0.334 (0.027) 
Children 14 – 17 (number of biological children aged 14 through 17) 0.230 (0.020) 
Urban (=1 if residence in urban area) 0.759 (0.036) 
Economic Conditions Variables   
Local Unemployment Rate (%) 0.071 (0.002) 
Local Per Capita Income ($1000s in year-2005 dollars) 11.602 (0.224) 
Portion of Local Labor Force Female (%) 0.412 (0.004) 
Local Population High-School Educated (%) 0.664 (0.009) 
Local Population College-Educated (%) 0.153 (0.005) 
Local Population Employed (%) 0.419 (0.005) 
Local Labor Force in Manufacturing (%) 0.195 (0.009) 
Local Labor Force in Wholesale/Retail Trade (%) 0.184 (0.003) 
Political Variables   
Representative’s ADA Ranking (higher is more liberal) 0.475 (0.013) 
Senator’s ADA Ranking (higher is more liberal) 0.563 (0.024) 
Democrat Governor (= 1 if governor is a Democrat) 0.416 (0.039) 
Portion of State House Democrat 0.567 (0.009) 
Portion of State Senate Democrat 0.549 (0.012) 
Welfare Characteristics Variables   
Post-TANF (=1 if TANF in force) 0.219 (0.020) 
Pre-Welfare Reform Waiver (=1 if state granted a pre-reform waiver) 0.155 (0.018) 
State Maximum Benefits (for a family of four in dollars) 4.267 (0.153) 
No Time Limit (=1 if lifetime receipt limit in force)a 0.130 (0.058) 
Time Limit (months of allowable lifetime receipt)a,b 57.397 (0.650) 
Family Caps (=1 if benefits capped for additional births)a 0.468 (0.062) 
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Child Age (in months under which caregivers are exempt from work)a 8.788 (0.747) 
Severe Sanctions (if full or permanent instead of partial and temporary)a 0.514 (0.061) 
Earned Income Disregards (flat dollar amount in first month)a 138.898 (12.137) 
Earned Income Disregards (percentage amount in first month)a 42.174 (1.941) 
Asset Limit ($s)a,c 2197.419 (111.501)
No Asset Limit (=1 if no asset limit)a 0.041 (0.019) 
TANF Vehicle Exemption ($s)a,d 5017.163 (145.006)
Vehicles Included in TANF Asset Test (=1 if vehicles included in asset test)a 0.643 (0.062) 
State Eligibility Characteristics   
FSP Vehicle Asset Limit ($1000s)a 0.206 (0.036) 
EBT (=1 if state uses the EBT program)a 0.429 (0.046) 
Non-Parental Adults in Household can be Caregiversa,e 0.595 (0.062) 
Simplified Periodic Reporting (=1 if reporting is periodic)a,f 0.833 (0.047) 
Categorical Eligibility (=1 if state allows categorical eligibility)a 0.693 (0.056) 
Severe Sanctions (=1 if sanctions for E&T offenses are severe)a,g 0.473 (0.063) 
Outreach Plan (=1 if state has FSP-approved outreach plan)a 0.526 (0.063) 
Sample means with standard errors in parentheses.  There are 1,590 welfare spell-observations.   a 
Only post-welfare reform childbirths are used for the descriptive statistic. b Only observations in states 
with time limits are used in the descriptive statistics. c Only observations in states with asset limits are 
used in the descriptive statistics.  d Only observations in states without vehicle exclusions are used in 
the descriptive statistics.  e The excluded category is only parents are allowed to be considered the 
caregiver.  f The excluded category is incident reporting. g Sanctions for E&T offenses are either 
extended beyond that normally required by the FSP, permanent (instead of temporary), or applied to 
the entire household (instead of only the offending member).  Political variables created with data 
from the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) (2005).  Information required to create the welfare 
variables is obtained from a report on state AFDC/TANF policies by Crouse (1999) and from the 
Urban Institute’s online Welfare Rules Database (The Urban Institute, 2005). 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Food Stamp Recipients and Non-Recipients 
Key Explanatory Variable Recipients Non-Recipients 
Food Stamp Benefits 2.346 (0.060) 0.000 (0.000) 
Demographic Characteristics     
Black 0.395 (0.044) 0.232 (0.049) 
Hispanic 0.095 (0.017) 0.122 (0.033) 
Age 31.380 (0.257) 32.166 (0.514) 
Education 11.810 (0.076) 12.081 (0.190) 
Marital Status 0.242 (0.026) 0.232 (0.049) 
Family Size 4.075 (0.107) 4.483 (0.287) 
Senior Citizen 0.070 (0.013) 0.056 (0.021) 
Children 0 – 2 0.307 (0.029) 0.260 (0.057) 
Children 3 – 5 0.445 (0.030) 0.347 (0.070) 
Children 6 – 10 0.879 (0.044) 0.722 (0.089) 
Children 11 – 13 0.340 (0.029) 0.291 (0.081) 
Children 14 – 17 0.233 (0.021) 0.214 (0.073) 
Urban 0.759 (0.039) 0.763 (0.055) 
Sample means with standard errors in parentheses.  There are 1,395 welfare spells that begin with 
Food Stamp benefits and 195 welfare spells that begin without Food Stamps.
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Table 3 
Selected Multinomial Logit Coefficient Estimates from Transition Models: The Effects of Food 
Stamps on Transitions off Welfare and Employment 
Transitions: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
On Welfare, Not Employed to:      
   Off Welfare, Not Employed 0.045 0.030 0.026 0.022 0.035 
 (0.066) (0.064) (0.066) (0.067) (0.065) 
   On Welfare, Employed 0.019 0.008 0.022 0.013 0.016 
 (0.064) (0.070) (0.072) (0.071) (0.074) 
   Off Welfare, Employed -0.156* -0.164* -0.178* -0.159 -0.187* 
 (0.095) (0.093) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) 
On Welfare, Employed to:      
   Off Welfare, Employed -0.069 -0.088 -0.103 -0.111 -0.144 
 (0.086) (0.084) (0.086) (0.086) (0.093) 
   On Welfare, Not Employed 0.278*** 0.296*** 0.310*** 0.304*** 0.321*** 
 (0.079) (0.090) (0.093) (0.096) (0.093) 
   Off Welfare, Not Employed -0.015 0.056 0.092 0.101 0.117 
 (0.155) (0.162) (0.179) (0.200) (0.162) 
Log-likelihood Value      
      
Variables      
   Demographic X X X X X 
   State  X X X X 
   Year  X X X X 
   Economic   X X X 
   Political    X X 
   Welfare     X 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.  There are 5,251 
observations initially on welfare and not employed and 1,638 observations initially on welfare and 
employed.  Employment is defined as working at least 10 hours per week.  The sample includes all 
female welfare recipients with at least one child under the age of 18. 
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Table 4 
Selected Multinomial Logit Coefficient Estimates from Transition Models: The Effects of Food 
Stamps on Transitions off Welfare and Employment on Alternative Samples 
Transitions: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
On Welfare, Not Employed to:     
   Off Welfare, Not Employed 0.009 -0.003 0.019 0.001 
 (0.064) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068) 
   On Welfare, Employed -0.016 -0.014 0.005 0.023 
 (0.070) (0.076) (0.075) (0.078) 
   Off Welfare, Employed -0.169 -0.152 -0.240** -0.107 
 (0.107) (0.099) (0.104) (0.109) 
Observations 5,259 5,357 5,081 4,102 
On Welfare, Employed to:     
   Off Welfare, Employed -0.161* -0.116 -0.144 -0.055 
 (0.085) (0.091) (0.092) (0.109) 
   On Welfare, Not Employed 0.279*** 0.292*** 0.282*** 0.374*** 
 (0.093) (0.105) (0.095) (0.108) 
   Off Welfare, Not Employed 0.162 0.283* 0.148 0.153 
 (0.171) (0.163) (0.159) (0.181) 
Observations 1,728 1,346 1,584 1,349 
Log-likelihood Value     
Definition of Employment Hours > 0 Hours ≥ 20 Hours ≥ 10 Hours ≥ 10 
Welfare Recipients All Moms All Moms All Moms Single Moms 
Children Under 18 Under 18 Under 14 Under 18 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.  The models contain the 
demographic, state, year, economic, political, and welfare variables. 
Table 5 
Selected Multinomial Logit Coefficient Estimates from Transition Models: The Effects of Food Stamps on Transitions off 
Welfare and Employment with and without Welfare Reform 
Transitions:    
On Welfare, Not Employed to: Off Welfare, Not Employed On Welfare, Employed Off Welfare, Employed 
   Food Stamps -0.033 -0.066 -0.344*** 
 (0.087) (0.086) (0.119) 
  Food Stamps*Welfare Reform 0.160 0.324*** 0.570*** 
 (0.113) (0.115) (0.163) 
On Welfare, Employed to: Off Welfare, Employed On Welfare, Not Employed Off Welfare, Not Employed 
   Food Stamps -0.213* 0.266** -0.040 
 (0.117) (0.110) (0.188) 
  Food Stamps*Welfare Reform 0.202 0.205 0.485 
 (0.177) (0.171) (0.345) 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.  There are 5,251 observations initially on welfare and not 
employed and 1,638 observations initially on welfare and employed.  The models contain the demographic, state, year, economic, 
political, and welfare variables.  The log-likelihood function value is XXX. 
 38
Table 6 
Selected Multinomial Logit Coefficient Estimates from Transition Models: The Effects of Food Stamps on Transitions off 
Welfare and Employment by Region of Residence 
Transitions:    
On Welfare, Not Employed to: Off Welfare, Not Employed On Welfare, Employed Off Welfare, Employed 
   Food Stamps 0.029 -0.032 -0.163 
 (0.078) (0.087) (0.118) 
  Food Stamps*South  0.015 0.146 -0.083 
 (0.089) (0.117) (0.155) 
On Welfare, Employed to: Off Welfare, Employed On Welfare, Not Employed Off Welfare, Not Employed 
   Food Stamps -0.191* 0.325** 0.105 
 (0.099) (0.102) (0.172) 
  Food Stamps*South  0.202 -0.001 0.053 
 (0.148) (0.137) (0.287) 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.  There are 5,251 observations initially on welfare and not 
employed and 1,638 observations initially on welfare and employed.  The models contain the demographic, state, year, economic, 
political, and welfare variables.  The log-likelihood function value is XXX. 
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Table 7 
Selected Multinomial Logit Coefficient Estimates from Transition Models: The Effects of Food Stamps and Public Housing 
Assistance on Transitions off Welfare and Employment 
Transitions:    
On Welfare, Not Employed to: Off Welfare, Not Employed On Welfare, Employed Off Welfare, Employed 
   Food Stamps 0.034 -0.081 -0.193* 
 (0.065) (0.075) (0.104) 
  Public Housing Assistance  0.022 0.121 -0.244 
 (0.162) (0.187) (0.319) 
On Welfare, Employed to: Off Welfare, Employed On Welfare, Not Employed Off Welfare, Not Employed 
   Food Stamps -0.141 0.323*** 0.121 
 (0.092) (0.093) (0.162) 
  Public Housing Assistance -0.279 -0.162 0.106 
 (0.264) (0.204) (0.496) 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.  There are 5,247 observations initially on welfare and not 
employed and 1,638 observations initially on welfare and employed.  The models contain the demographic, state, year, economic, 
political, and welfare variables.  The log-likelihood function value is XXX. 
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Figure 2 
Employed Welfare Recipients
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Figure 3 
Non-Employed Welfare Recipients, without Food Stamps
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Figure 4 
Non-Employed Welfare Recipients, with Food Stamps
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Figure 5 
Employed Welfare Recipients, without Food Stamps
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Figure 6 
Employed Welfare Recipients, with Food Stamps
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Figure 7 
Non-Employed Welfare Recipients, No Food Stamps
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Quarter
P
ro
po
rti
on Survivor Rate
No Welfare, Not Employed
Welfare, Employed
No Welfare, Employed
 
Figure 8 
 
Non-Employed Welfare Recipients, with Food Stamps
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Figure 9 
Employed Welfare Recipients, without Food Stamps
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Figure 10 
Employed Welfare Recipients, with Food Stamps
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Appendix Table A: Selected Results for the Probability of Receiving Food Stamps  
Constant 2.343 (1.638) 
Black 1.608*** (0.177) 
Hispanic -0.013 (0.212) 
Age 0.013 (0.027) 
Education -0.259*** (0.043) 
Marital Status 0.262* (0.137) 
Family Size -0.313*** (0.036) 
Senior Citizen 0.334* (0.200) 
Children 0 – 2 0.506*** (0.118) 
Children 3 – 5 0.694*** (0.112) 
Children 6 – 10 0.602*** (0.083) 
Children 11 – 13 0.489*** (0.120) 
Children 14 – 17 0.470*** (0.104) 
Urban -0.974*** (0.185) 
Unemployment Rate -2.684 (2.963) 
Per Capita Income 0.058 (0.041) 
Labor Force Female -1.402 (2.192) 
Population High-School Educated -1.089 (1.310) 
Population College-Educated -0.628 (2.218) 
Population Employed 0.477 (1.983) 
Labor Force in Manufacturing -4.001*** (0.928) 
Labor Force in Trade 3.356 (3.178) 
Representative’s ADA Ranking 2.878*** (0.495) 
Senator’s ADA Ranking 0.657*** (0.254) 
Democrat Governor -0.083 (0.145) 
State House Democrat 1.352 (1.101) 
State Senate Democrat -2.156** (0.977) 
FSP Vehicle Asset Limit 1.333*** (0.316) 
EBT 0.008 (0.241) 
Non-Parental Adult Caregivers -1.333*** (0.308) 
Simplified Periodic Reporting 0.240 (0.246) 
Categorical Eligibility 0.469* (0.276) 
Severe Sanctions -1.418*** (0.291) 
Outreach Plan 0.163 (0.266) 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.  There are 8,428 
observations used in the Food Stamp receipt model.  The sample includes all female welfare 
recipients with at least one child under the age of 18.  Results are taken from model 5 in table 3 
(with the full set of covariates included.)  Log-likelihood function value: -5,529.11. 
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Appendix Table B1: Selected Results from Transition Models: On Welfare, Not Employed  
Covariate 
Off Welfare, Not 
Employed 
On Welfare, 
Employed 
Off Welfare, 
Employed 
Constant 4.472 (4.200) -9.817** (3.997) -10.183 (56.373) 
Black -0.969*** (0.255) 0.249 (0.235) -1.51*** (0.489) 
Hispanic 0.003 (0.320) -0.331 (0.422) -0.705 (0.559) 
Age -0.026 (0.039) 0.018 (0.043) -0.046 (0.068) 
Education 0.130** (0.056) 0.035 (0.082) 0.427*** (0.106) 
Marital Status 0.738*** (0.213) -0.493** (0.245) 0.478 (0.351) 
Family Size 0.035 (0.073) 0.052 (0.082) 0.043 (0.133) 
Senior Citizen 0.142 (0.243) -0.132 (0.371) -0.363 (0.613) 
Children 0 – 2 -0.424** (0.183) -0.166 (0.193) -0.615* (0.338) 
Children 3 – 5 -0.813*** (0.178) 0.197 (0.186) -0.517* (0.325) 
Children 6 – 10 -0.146 (0.157) 0.033 (0.150) 0.287 (0.293) 
Children 11 – 13 -0.387** (0.175) -0.154 (0.198) -0.312 (0.327) 
Children 14 – 17 -0.144 (0.193) -0.063 (0.223) -0.214 (0.376) 
Urban 0.720*** (0.287) 0.145 (0.281) 0.302 (0.446) 
Unemployment Rate 1.283 (4.851) -5.682 (5.186) 9.871 (7.874) 
Per Capita Income -0.058 (0.072) -0.165** (0.072) -0.143 (0.124) 
Labor Force Female 2.090 (2.919) -0.496 (3.069) -1.811 (6.314) 
Population High-School Educated -0.679 (2.221) 3.610 (2.333) -1.570 (3.251) 
Population College-Educated 6.830* (3.884) -7.070* (4.214) 5.652 (6.121) 
Population Employed -4.703 (3.635) 7.178** (3.342) 4.396 (6.048) 
Labor Force in Manufacturing 0.460 (1.636) -3.738** (1.587) 1.986 (3.401) 
Labor Force in Trade -6.869 (4.612) -5.405 (4.716) 11.946 (10.197) 
Representative’s ADA Ranking -2.043** (1.020) 1.641* (0.932) -1.738 (1.536) 
Senator’s ADA Ranking 1.243** (0.549) -0.808 (0.520) -0.418 (0.958) 
Democrat Governor -0.162 (0.256) 0.334 (0.268) -1.187** (0.499) 
State House Democrat -1.354 (1.886) 2.993* (1.716) -3.491 (3.666) 
State Senate Democrat -1.028 (1.492) -2.911* (1.509) 2.444 (2.473) 
Post-TANF 0.223 (1.368) -1.360 (1.375) 1.970 (2.544) 
Pre-Welfare Reform Waiver 0.152 (0.365) 0.196 (0.318) -0.192 (0.676) 
State Maximum Benefits -0.400*** (0.100) 0.359*** (0.110) -0.401* (0.216) 
No Time Limit -1.230 (3.523) 1.217 (2.905) 4.785 (56.286) 
Time Limit -0.031 (0.054) 0.027 (0.042) 0.045 (0.937) 
Family Caps -0.124 (0.550) 0.204 (0.543) 0.353 (0.981) 
Child Age 0.024 (0.030) -0.045 (0.037) 0.035 (0.037) 
Severe Sanctions 0.844 (0.559) -0.621 (0.531) -1.307 (1.016) 
Earned Income Disregards -0.001 (0.002) 0.003 (0.003) -0.003 (0.006) 
Earned Income Disregards -0.003 (0.012) 0.025* (0.015) -0.013 (0.026) 
Asset Limit -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
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No Asset Limit 2.245 (3.397) -4.114 (3.070) -1.034 (22.102) 
TANF Vehicle Exemption 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) 
Vehicles Included in Asset Test -0.085 (0.606) 0.282 (0.478) -1.787* (0.958) 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.  There are 5,251 
observations initially on welfare and not employed.  Employment is defined as working at least 10 
hours per week.  The sample includes all female welfare recipients with at least one child under the 
age of 18.  Results are taken from model 5 in table 3 (with the full set of covariates included.)  Log-
likelihood function value: -5,529.11. 
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Appendix Table B2: Selected Results from Transition Models: On Welfare, Employed  
Covariate 
Off Welfare, 
Employed 
On Welfare, Not 
Employed 
Off Welfare, Not 
Employed 
Constant -8.760 (6.651) -0.985 (6.258) 4.303 (22.216) 
Black -0.999*** (0.390) -0.135 (0.363) -0.690 (1.174) 
Hispanic -0.497 (0.646) 0.181 (0.446) -0.971 (1.482) 
Age 0.028 (0.067) -0.055 (0.053) -0.173 (0.203) 
Education 0.183 (0.126) -0.042 (0.087) 0.417 (0.390) 
Marital Status -0.025 (0.393) -0.183 (0.332) 0.515 (0.861) 
Family Size 0.019 (0.115) 0.073 (0.098) 0.052 (0.295) 
Senior Citizen -0.520 (0.708) -0.082 (0.406) 0.632 (1.056) 
Children 0 – 2 0.123 (0.342) -0.261 (0.236) -0.796 (0.779) 
Children 3 – 5 -0.230 (0.324) -0.218 (0.240) -0.367 (0.620) 
Children 6 – 10 -0.141 (0.236) -0.259 (0.196) 0.277 (0.550) 
Children 11 – 13 0.052 (0.312) -0.418* (0.259) -0.481 (0.676) 
Children 14 – 17 0.011 (0.3780 -0.692** (0.268) 0.320 (0.905) 
Urban -0.031 (0.459) -0.361 (0.415) 0.747 (1.253) 
Unemployment Rate 6.826 (8.624) 1.035 (7.058) -21.947 (21.509) 
Per Capita Income -0.121 (0.107) 0.092 (0.104) -0.174 (0.381) 
Labor Force Female 3.235 (5.578) 5.768 (4.700) 2.502 (13.496) 
Population High-School Educated 0.424 (4.055) -4.228 (3.512) 7.216 (8.658) 
Population College-Educated 0.035 (7.124) 1.559 (5.447) -15.790 (21.067) 
Population Employed 5.921 (5.954) -1.537 (4.878) 3.608 (13.110) 
Labor Force in Manufacturing -2.731 (2.597) 0.718 (1.942) -3.147 (7.911) 
Labor Force in Trade -4.353 (9.281) 2.800 (7.106) -20.881 (22.291) 
Representative’s ADA Ranking -1.537 (1.428) 1.178 (1.067) 3.278 (4.924) 
Senator’s ADA Ranking -0.255 (0.822) 0.063 (0.521) 2.069 (2.207) 
Democrat Governor 0.201 (0.459) 0.223 (0.367) -0.825 (1.173) 
State House Democrat 0.938 (3.234) 1.961 (2.640) 1.003 (12.684) 
State Senate Democrat 1.116 (2.294) -1.046 (2.494) -4.375 (8.349) 
Post-TANF 3.106 (2.020) -0.806 (2.048) 0.256 (7.809) 
Pre-Welfare Reform Waiver 1.378*** (0.460) -0.269 (0.421) -0.186 (1.278) 
State Maximum Benefits -0.328* (0.195) 0.299* (0.160) -0.642 (0.889) 
No Time Limit 1.259 (4.341) -0.109 (4.048) -0.691 (19.696) 
Time Limit -0.035 (0.065) 0.017 (0.055) -0.037 (0.344) 
Family Caps -0.253 (1.159) -0.252 (0.881) -1.741 (3.643) 
Child Age -0.009 (0.044) 0.041 (0.085) -0.058 (0.122) 
Severe Sanctions -1.993** (1.051) 0.495 (0.798) -0.482 (3.630) 
Earned Income Disregards 0.000 (0.006) 0.003 (0.005) 0.005 (0.020) 
Earned Income Disregards 0.045 (0.023) -0.026 (0.023) 0.050 (0.085) 
Asset Limit 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
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No Asset Limit 2.117 (4.468) 3.317 (4.916) -18.734 (0.001) 
TANF Vehicle Exemption 0.002** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Vehicles Included in Asset Test -0.936 (0.711) -0.722 (0.692) -0.996 (2.877) 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.  There are 1,638 
observations initially on welfare and employed.  Employment is defined as working at least 10 hours 
per week.  The sample includes all female welfare recipients with at least one child under the age of 
18.  Results are taken from model 5 in table 3 (with the full set of covariates included.)  Log-
likelihood function value: -5,529.11. 
 
 
 
 50
